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ARTIFICIAL PROLONGATION OF LIFE IN
DEFECTIVE AND PREMATURE INFANTS:
TECHNOLOGY OUTSTRIPS MORAL AND LEGAL
DECISION-MAKING CAPABILITIES
by
Baxter Dunaway* and Deon Dunaway**
Past controversy concerning the issue of legally protectable "life"
has been centered on the unborn child. Because of questions regarding
liability for injury to or destruction of the fetus and especially because
of questions concerning abortion, it has become necessary to
determine at what point the fetus may be considered a legally
protectable entity. While the legal debate concerning the point in time
that a fetus becomes a person has continued, advances in medical
skills have raised additional issues concerning the protectable "life"
of a newborn premature and/or defective infant.
Today, through improved medical technology, premature infants
who are insufficiently developed at birth have a much greater chance
of survival than those born a generation ago. Premature babies, as
well as those afflicted with severe birth defects, can be kept alive by
artificial means. Under such circumstances, however, there remains
the option of withholding treatment and thus allowing the infant to
face a natural death.
Advances in medical technology have placed doctors and parents in
a position to decide if the use of such extraordinary measures to pro-
long the life of an infant should be implemented or continued. An ex-
amination of the current state of the law with regard to such decisions
should be made from procedural and substantive perspectives. As it
exists, the law does not provide those in a decision making capacity
with the proper criteria and information to make a legally proper
decision. Parents, doctors and health care institutions, risk the pro-
spect of incurring civil and criminal liability. Although realistically
diminished by the reluctance of prosecutorial agencies to persist in
these types of cases, such grave risks will continue to exist until a pro-
cedure is developed by which the determinations to artificially con-
tinue an infant's life may be made. Such decisions raise legal ques-
tions never before encountered, as well as moral, religious,
economical, and psychological issues.
*B.S. 1950, Auburn University; J.D. 1960, George Washington University; Professor
of Law, University of Pepperdine Law School.
-B.S. 1960, Oklahoma State University; Ph.D. 1973, Baylor University Medical
School; former Assistant Professor, University of California Medical School, Irvine;
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This article will discuss the changes in medical technology in deal-
ing with significant types of defective and premature births, and the
resulting problems created by sustaining the life of defective infants.
We will review current practices regarding decisions whether to treat
the infant, the legal liability of those who make such decisions, and
the inadequacy of current law. Lastly, some suggestions are made of
approaches to modifying current law.
DEVELOPING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY
Through improved medical technology developed within the last
fifteen years, physiologically immature infants of increasingly
smaller weight are being saved in greater numbers in modern inten-
sive care nurseries. These infants are often transported great distances
in specially equipped ambulances and helicopters to regular hospitals
for care by highly skilled medical personnel with access to the
necessary equipment. Once in the care of these specialists, the major-
ity of the infants progress well, although some, particularly the
smallest and least mature, may suffer extensive damage to the brain
or other parts of the body. Technology exists which allows severely
defective infants who have suffered serious complications to be kept
alive although the underlying defects may never be corrected. If
necessary, the life function of these children may be prolonged in-
definitely.
The mortality rate during the early critical weeks of life rises with
increasing degrees of prematurity of the newborn infant. Babies who
weigh less than one thousand grams (2.2 pounds) at birth, have mor-
tality rates as high as 82% during the first month of life.' Of those
who survive, defective cardiac, pulmonary, gastrointestinal, and
neural development contribute to problems in care and to the
possibility of a permanent handicap. In some cases, the machines used
to sustain life can also be factors in causing damage.
Studies have reported the occurrence of major handicaps in babies
weighing less than one thousand grams at birth to be from 7%2 to
'Usher, The Special Problems of the Premature Infant, NEONATOLOcY,
PATHOPHYSIOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT OF THE NEWBORN 57 (G. Avery ed. 1975). At the
Royal Victoria Hospital in Montreal between 1966 and 1970, there were 31 infants
born alive between 501 and 750 grams in weight, of whom 97% died. The mortality
rate decreased for infants of increasing birth weight, and was 72% for babies weighing
from 751 to 1000 grams, and .25% for those weighing over 2,500 grams. Id. at 170.
2Stewart, Turcan, Rawlings and Reynolds, Prognosis for Infants Weighing 1000 g or
Less at Birth, 52 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 97, 102 (1977). Statistics on the fre-
quency of major handicaps among infants weighing one thousand grams or less at birth
are not consistent because relatively few infants are studied. During the 10 years of this
study from 1966 to 1977, only 148 such infants were admitted to the Neonatal Unit of
University College Hospital. The 7% found to have major handicaps derived from only
two births. Moreover, follow-up studies that could detect major handicaps not obser-
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85%1 with increasing probability of handicap as the birth weight
decreases. Recent two-year follow-up studies have shown major
neurological defects such as cerebral palsy and hydrocephalus 4 with
extensive paralysis and severe impairment of physical development in
30% of the infants who were less than one thousand grams at birth. s
Another study reported moderate to severe deficiencies in
neurodevelopment in 25% of infants less than one thousand grams
birthweight who were studied until 10-36 months of age.' Im-
provements in prenatal care have raised the probability of survival
for infants of very low birth weight.7
There is hope that the chance of survival of infants with severe birth
defects may also be increased.' Examples of severe defects include
hydrocephaly where a child is born with an enlarged head due to ex-
cess free fluid in the cranial activity; anecephaly, which is
characterized by a total or partial lack of a brain; spina bifida, which
is a deformity of the base of the spine; and Down's Syndrome, com-
vable at birth are stifled by the low survival rate of these infants. Only 32% survived the
neonatal period in this study. Id. at 97-98.
3Lubchenco, Delivoria-Papadopoulos and Searls, Long-term Follow-up Studies of
Prematurely Born Infants. II. Influence of Birth Weight and Gestational Age on Se-
quelae, 80 1. PEDIATRICS 509, 511 (1972). At 10 years of age moderte to severe handi-
caps such as I.Q. below 89, spastic paralysis, and blindness were observed in 85% of
those infants weighing less that 950 grams at birth; 70% in those who weighed 950 to
1,150 grams at birth, decreasing to a 35% occurrence in those weighing 1350 to 1500
grams at birth. Id. at 510 (Table II).
'Hydrocephalus is a condition characterized by an abnormal accumulation of fluid in
the cranial vault, accompanied by enlargement of the head, prominence of the
forehead, atrophy of the brain, mental weakness, and convulsions. DORLAND'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 693 (24th ed. 1965).
'Pape, Buncic, Ashby and Fitzhardinge, The Status at Two Years of Low-Birth-
Weight Infants Born in 1974 with Birth Weights of Less than 1,001 gin., 92 J.
PEDIATRICS 253, 258 (1978). Defects of the central nervous system were closely
associated with a neonatal history of intracranial hemorrhage or seizures or both. Id. at
253.
'Bhat, Raju, and Vidyasgar, Immediate and Long-term Outcome of Infants Less than
1000 grams, 6 CRITICAL CARE MED. 148-50 (1978).
7Id. at 150.
'Improvements in care at the Los Angeles County-USC Medical Center from 1965 to
1970 have been described in Teberg, Hodgman, Wu and Spears, Recent Improvement
in Outcome for the Small Premature Infant, 16 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 307 (1977). In
1965 there was increased attention to ambient temperature in the nursery. In 1966,
blood glucose levels began to be routinely monitored during the first 24 hours in infants
of less than 2,250 grams and early institution of fluids by vein was begun. In 1967 for-
mula feedings within the first 12 hours of life became routine. Phototherapy for elevated
bilirubin levels began in 1968. In 1969 monitoring on a 24-hour basis of oxygen and
carbon dioxide levels in the blood became available. Assisted ventilation for infants was
established in 1970. Between 1965 and 1970 the perinatal mortality rate, which in-
cludes fetal deaths plus neonatal deaths in the first month of life, fell from 49 to 34 per
1,000 total births. Id. at 310.
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monly known as mongolism, which is characterized by an abnormal-
ly shaped body and mental retardation.
PROBLEMS CREATED IN SUSTAINING IMPAIRED INFANTS
Emotional Stress
Being the parent of a very premature infant can be emotionally try-
ing. Usher, in his book, describes it this way:
The infant looks like nothing on earth to the new parents. There are
tubes and wires all over, and the treatment area is often a frightening
hubbub of emergencies. It is difficult to relate to the son or daughter
in the incubator and almost impossible to image taking "it" home 2
months later as a healthy infant. The physician can give no assurance
of survival, and the parents are afraid to ask about sequelae [afteref-
fects]. Then follow days or weeks of sudden ups and downs, with every
telephone call or personal contact with nurses or doctors beginning
with a moment of fright that the news may be bad 9
If the premature infant is handicapped with one or more birth
defects, there are additional concerns. Some families benefit from the
addition of a handicapped child but, unfortunately, many do not. In
discussing ethical problems in pediatrics, one author states, "it is
clear that the stress of raising a seriously handicapped child is
associated with a higher rate of divorce, as well as less measurable in-
dices of family disruption."'" A study of families of children with the
severe defect of meningomyelocele" and hydrocephalus, stated that
62% of the parents had adjusted poorly and 46% of the parents were
separated or divorced. 2 Studies have also shown that there is a high
degree of abuse of infants born prematurely with handicaps. Related
to these instances of child abuse is a high degree of isolation and
separation of infants from parents in the newborn period, 3 due to ex-
tended medical treatment periods. In turn, higher incidence of low
birthweights has been found to be correlated to lower economic and
social deprivation of the parents. These familial conditions when
coupled with the impaired condition of the child tend to suggest that
abuse of the infant is quite probable. As more sophisticated methods
'Usher, supra note 1, at 183.
"Fost, Ethical Problems in Pediatrics, VI CURRENT PROBLEMS IN PEDIATRICS, 12, 13-14
(1976).
"Meningomyelocele is a hernial protusion of a part of the meninges (the three mem-
branes that envelope the brain and spinal cord) and substance of the spinal chord
through a defect in the vertebral column. DORLAND'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 897 (24th ed.
1965).
"Kolin, Scherzer, New and Garfield, Studies of the School-age Child with Men-
ingolymelocele Social and Emotional Adaptation, 78 J. PEDIATRICS 1013, 1015, no. 6
(1971).
"
3Klein and Stern, Low Birth Weight and the Battered Child Syndrome, 122 AMER. J.
[Vol. 2:35
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for sustaining the life of newborns have become available, it has
become evident that there may be circumstances in which it is not in
the infant's, the family's, or society's best interest to utilize such ex-
traordinary methods.
Economic Costs
The economic cost of hospital care for low-birthweight infants is
high. The cost of hospital care for seventy-five infants weighing 1000
grams or less at birth was reported by the Cedars-Sinai Medical
Center in Los Angeles. Calculations of the September 1976 average
hospital rates excluding doctors' bills, for each of the thirty surviving
infants were $450 per diem and $40,287 for the period of treatment.
For the forty-five infants who died, the average daily and total costs
were $825 and $14,236, respectively.'" When the total cost of treat-
ment for the entire group (including doctors' fees) was averaged out
over the thirty survivors, the cost per normal survivor amounted to
$88,058. Developmental and neurological valuations of the survivors
revealed that at one to three years of age, 70% were normal.'" The
estimated cost of lifetime "custodial" care for an impaired child was
approximately $250,000 (in 1971 values).'"
Current Practices Regarding Decisions for Nontreatment
Failing to initiate treatment at birth of a defective infant or discon-
tinuing artificial means of sustaining life will probably cause a defec-
tive infant to die. The law has viewed failure to treat as less culpable
than the affirmative act of discontinuing treatment." Laypersons and
medical personnel tend to view the affirmative discontinuance of
treatment as the more difficult decision to make. However, some doc-
tors have come to the conclusion that the decision not to initiate life
support measures is no different from the decision to discontinue
treatment. This seems to be the trend of current medical thought."
DIs. CHILD 15, 17-18 (1971). In Montreal Children's Hospital, 51 cases of battered child
syndrome were seen from 1960 through 1969. Twelve (23.5%) were low birth weight
infants compared to an expected 7-8% based on the low birth weight rate in the area.
Id. at 16-17.
"Stern, Prematurity as a Factor in Child Abuse, 8 HOSPITAL PRAC. 117, 119, no. 5
(1973).
"Pomerance, Ukrainski, Ukra, Henderson, Nash and Meredith, Cost of Living for In-
fants Weighing 1,000 Grams or Less at Birth, 61 PEDIATRICS 908, 909 (1978). The ac-
tual cost for infants who survive is greatly underestimated. The figure becomes
$61,641.00 per survivor when the total adjusted cost for all 75 infants is used. Although
physicians' fees were not included, they represent only 5% of the total bill. Id.
"Herman, Priorities, Problems, Funding for the Handicapped Child, Proceedings of
Workshop at Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago, Northwestern University, May 7,
(1971).
"W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 56 (4th ed. 1971).
"
8A.M.A. NEWS. Dec. 1973, at 15, col. 2.
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One southern California neonatologist"9 stated, "If we are going to in-
itiate it (life-support measures) we must be willing to discontinue it." 2
In this discussion, the failure to initiate life-support systems (nontreat-
ment), and discontinuing such support will be treated as equivalent.
An examination of some of the considerations involved in decisions
for nontreatment and the various types of decision-making procedures
follows.
Decisions Made by Medical Personnel
The extent to which the decision for nontreatment is made solely by
the doctor or doctors in charge of the infant is surprising. At one time,
it was not uncommon for doctors at many hospitals to turn off the
respirator "at night, alone, without the parents knowing." 21 Today,
some physicians still regard the decision to prolong life or discontinue
treatment as a difficult and lonely task but one which, in the last
analysis, only the physician himself can make.22 In an analogous con-
text, doctors treating cancer patients have reported unilaterally
deciding not to resuscitate a patient and later informing the family of
the decision. One reason offered for their action is that they do not
want the family to have to make such a decision while under stress,
only to live with possible feelings of guilt afterward.23 Dr. William J.
Winslade, Co-Director of the UCLA Program in Medicine, Law, and
Human Values has said, "Doctors don't believe responsibility should
be shifted to the patient and family. They don't really think that in-
formed consent is something patients can exercise.... [Tlhere also is a
lack of respect for the capacities of patients on the part of people in
medicine."-21 In one Los Angeles hospital in which machinery in the
newborn intensive care unit is turned off at least weekly, it is viewed
as basically a medical decision. 20 Dr. Mildred Stahlman, a Vanderbilt
University pediatrician, stated "When to abandon ship, to declare
such an infant unmanageable, should remain an individual judgment
made at the time, by the physician responsible for the neonate's life
and care."2
"A neonatologist is a physician whose speciality is the art and science of diagnosis
and treatment of disorders of the newborn infant. DORLAND'S MEDICAL DICriONARY 987
(24th ed. 1965).
"L.A. Times, Apr. 22, 1979, pt. ii, at 1, cot. I.
Id. at 1 cot. 4.
"Lewis, Machine Medicine and Its Relation to the Fatally I1, 206 J.A.M.A. 387,
(1968).
"L.A. Times, Feb. 7, 1979, pt. iv, at 6, col. 2.
14Id. Jan. 8, 1979, pt. i, at 21, col. 3.
257d. Apr. 22, 1979, pt. ii, at 5, col. 5.
z"Stahlman, Ethical Dilemmas in Perinatal Medicine, 94 J. PEDIATRICS 516, 517
(1979).
[Vol. 2:35
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Decisions Made by Parents, or
Parents in Consultation with Physician
The most common method of making the decision for nontreatment
appears to be a joint decision by the parents and the physician in
charge.2" Commentators have suggested that the final decision must
rest with the parents and the physician. Nevertheless, it must be
recognized that the physician may, in effect, still be making the actual
decision. In any event, the parents' consent will generally be based
heavily on the prognosis given by him for the child's survival.28
In some cases, the parents will simply decide not to have their
newborn treated and the physician will acquiesce in this decision,
even though he or she would have acted otherwise. An example was
found where a viable, but mongoloid baby starved to death because
the parents did not want him and the child's physicians merely
assented to the parents' wishes.29 An unknown number of parents
neglect to treat infants afflicted with a variety of disorders and defects
by not consulting physicians. Instances where a child is in need of in-
stitutional care, but not placed in a medical facility, are usually
brought to light in criminal proceedings.3"
Decision by Committee
In contrast to a decision made soley by the parents and the physi-
cian in charge, the decision may also be made by others. In the major
newborn centers in Los Angeles, the decision of nontreatment is one
generally made collectively by a group composed of the parents, the
attending physician, and other staff physicians." Some hospitals have
set up an "Ethics Committee" to decide whether to treat a child.
32
However, there appears to be little uniformity in the composition,
authority, or effectiveness of these committees at this time.
The committee decision approach has been judicially approved in
"L.A. Times, Apr. 22, 1979, pt. ii, at 4, col. 1.
"Duff and Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery, 289
NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 890, 894 (1973). Forty-three of 299 consecutive infant deaths oc-
curring in a special care nursery were related to withholding treatment. The authors in-
sist this issue cannot be decided by default. The decision to withhold treatment is
awesome in its finality but necessary if families are to avoid the devastating effect of
maintaining infants incapable of leading meaningful lives. Unless physicians are to
become "'cruel masters of human beings instead of their servants", they should be held
accountable for outlining all the management options and possible consequences
available to the parents. Id.
"Gustafson, Mongolism, Parental Desires, and the Right to Life, 16 PERSPECTIVES [N
BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE 529 (1973).
"See, e.g., State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 471, 181 A. 2d 751, 759 (1962) cert.
denied 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
"L.A. Times, Apr. 22, 1979, pt. ii, at 5, col. 2.
"See, e.g., Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 35, 355 A.2d 647, 671 (1976).
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the case of In the Matter of Karen Quinlan."5 Karen Quinlan's condi-
tion was characterized as a "chronic persistent vegetative state" with
"no cognitive function."3 In this well-known case Ms. Quinlan's
father sought express power as his twenty-one year old daughter's
guardian to authorize discontinuance of all extraordinary s pro-
cedures for sustaining her vital processes. The New Jersey Supreme
Court concluded that the father's concurrence, as guardian, in the
decision made by attending physicians and the hospital ethics com-
mittee to withdraw support systems was permissible, and that the pro-
cedure would circumvent any civil or criminal liability on the part of
any of the participants.36
Judicial Intervention in the Decision-Making Process
Not all jurisdictions view the hospital ethics committee as a proper
decision-making panel. In complete contrast to the Quinlan holding a
Massachusetts court, in the case of Superintendant of Belchertown v.
Saikewicz,37 rejected the committee approach to the decision-making
process for terminating treatment of an incompetent, mentally retard-
ed adult dying of cancer.3" Although the Massachusetts court express-
ed that a judicial tribunal would find the considerations and advice of
the committee of great assistance, it should not be required to accept
or to require a committee procedure. The court stated:
We take a dim view of any attempt to shift the ultimate decision-
making responsibility away from the duly established courts of proper
jurisdiction to any committee, panel or group, ad hoc or permanent.
Thus, we reject the approach adopted by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in the Quinlan case of entrusting the decision whether to con-
tinue artificial life support to the patient's guardian, family, attending
doctors, and hospital "ethics committee.""
The Saikewicz court was obviously of the opinion that the state
should assert its countervailing interests in the decision-making pro-
cess. Those interests indicated by the court were "1) the preservation
of life; 2) the protection of interests of innocent third parties; 3) the
prevention of suicide; and 4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the
medical profession.-40
370 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
31d. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654.5Id. at 31, 355 A.2d at 651.
3 Id. at 55, 355 A.2d at 672.
-1370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977). See also Eichner v. Dillon, 73 App. Div. 2d 431, 426
N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980).
"'370 N.E.2d at 434.
3 9 Id.
"Id. at 425. See also Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown College,
Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964) cert. denied, 377 U.S. 987(1964); John F. Kennedy
Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Hosp. v. Ander-
(Vol. 2::35
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In those circumstances where the courts have placed themselves in
the decision-making role, a procedural mechanism known as
"substituted judgment" has been utilizied.4' Basically, the court
representing the state as parens patriae, decides what it deems to be in
the best interest of the individual. Thus the court is in a position to
consider subjective values and desires of the affected individual.4 2
Legal Liability of Decision-Makers
With the exception of the court-sanctioned processes, the par-
ticipants in any other type of decision-making procedures are, in most
instances, acting illegally, given current law. Every state has a
statutory civil remedy for wrongful death as well as criminal sanc-
tions for homicide. 3 The civil statutes usually provide that the action
can be maintained for "any wrongful act, neglect or default" which
causes death, including both intentional and negligent torts. 4 4 It is
possible that the parents, physicians, hospital board, or other parties
to a decision for nontreatment could be held liable under these
statutes for the withholding of medical care. 5 Criminal charges could
also be brought against such parties in the event of the infant's death.
Inadequacy of Current Law
Today, treatment is denied or withdrawn from deformed infants by
a variety of decision-makers with very little guidance or uniformity.
The participants in these decisions face serious risks of legal liability
under current law. Yet there has been little application of the law in
this area, apparently because society, represented by prosecutors,
judges, and juries, does not believe that the persons involved have
acted in such a manner as to incur criminal punishment or be sub-
jected to civil liability. One easy means of avoiding application of the
law is to attribute the death to factors other than withdrawal of treat-
son, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); State v. Per-
ricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962), cert denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
'See, e.g., Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 548 (1980); In Re
Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 749 n.10 (D.C. 1979); Superintendent of Belchertown v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430-31 (Mass. 1977).
41370 N.E.2d at 430.
"W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 127 at 902 (4th ed. 1971). Wrongful
death statutes overcome the common law prohibition against recovery by third persons
who have lost the services of the decedent. Most statutes create a new cause of action for
the death in the decedent's representative for the benefit of designated persons. Id.
"Id. at 903.
"
5For an excellent analysis of the legal grounds for civil and criminal liability, see
Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 213, 217-44 (1975).
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ment."6 Another has been to appeal to the sympathies of a court or
jury, hoping they will not find liability. 7 Because the current law of-
fers little, if any, real guidance to parents or physicians, and because
the law currently is easily evaded and ignored, it is inadequate to
safeguard the rights and prerogatives of all concerned, including the
infants.
APPROACHES To DECISION-MAKING REGARDING NONTREATMENT
Common Law Approach
Due to the absence of legislative enactments, the approach now in
use concerning medical nontreatment in general is to make decisions
on a case-by-case basis. The two principal issues to be considered are:
the procedural requirements for decision-making; and, the standards
which the decision-makers must apply. The courts in many earlier
cases did not squarely face these concerns, but attempted to find
"justice" without articulating their reasoning or by trying to fit the
unique facts into a traditional legal pigeon hole.
The Quinlan and Saikewicz courts faced the issues involving the
withdrawal of life support or the failure to utilize life-prolonging
treatments. With regard to the procedural requirements, the court in
Quinlan, in deference to the family and medical community, required
that physicians and guardians of the patient concur in the nontreat-
ment decision. If there was concurrence of opinion, the decision then
was to be referred to the hospital "Ethics Committee" or a similar
body. If the committee agreed that treatment ought to be terminated,
the court held that there would be no civil or criminal libility.5 s The
court in Saikewicz rejected the view that the decision could be en-
trusted to the guardian, family, attending doctors, or hospital ethics
committee and instead held that the decision must be made by the
courts.,2 Thus, through common law development, the courts are
establishing procedural requirements. The developing common law
will determine the procedure required for a recommendation of non-
treatment for a severely abnormal newborn. 3
4'L.A. Times, Apr. 22, 1979, pt. ii, at 1, col. 2. Prosecutor declined to file charges
against doctors who disconnected life support apparatus from an infant that had suf-
fered irreversible brain damage due to auto accident. The basis for failure to file charges
was that the death was caused by the auto accident. Id.
"MacMillan, Birth-fDefrctiue Infants A Standard for Nontreatment Dcisians, 30
STAN. L. REv. 599, 615 n. 84 (1978).
4 'Robertson, supra note 45 at 217-18.
"Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
" Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
"170 N.J. at 35-36, 355 A.2d at 671-72.
2370 N.E.2d at 434.
"For scattered references to unreported cases where courts required treatment of
[Vol. 2:35
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Building upon common law background, various theories of
nonliability could be developed by the courts on a case-by-case basis.
Several such theories have already been advanced. For example, as
discussed previously, one theory of nonliability might be based upon
the belief that the nontreatment was not the actual cause of the
infant's death."4 However, this theory would have to be rationalized
with case law in some states holding that even if an infant is certain to
die from its deformities, the accelerating of a certain death is
homicide."5
A second, but less defensible approach would be to expand the doc-
trine of "necessity" as a defense to either a civil or criminal charge.
This doctrine provides that one may harm another, even including the
killing of another, if the act of harming the other is necessary to pre-
vent an equal or greater harm to the actor.5 "
A third approach would be for a court to examine the degree of
deformity in an infant, and if the deformity is extreme, to find the in-
fant to lack sufficient intelligence to be considered a legal "person."
Therefore treatment could legally be withheld. In Quinlan, the court
held that life support could be withdrawn if there was no reasonable
possibility of the patient ever emerging from her present comatose
state to a "cognitive, sapient state."5 " The United States Supreme
Court, in Roe v. Wade, 8 determined the point at which a fetus could
no longer be aborted was the time at which the fetus was presumed to
be viable. The Court stated, "This is so because the fetus then
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's
womb."5 5 Thus, a tenuous argument can be made, based on these opi-
nions, that only "meaningful" life is to be protected and that an infant
without the capability of intelligence is not a meaningful life.
The approach taken in Saikewicz was to invoke the doctrine of
"substituted judgment" and, in effect, have someone try to anticipate
how the patient would decide the question of nontreatment if he were
able to decide for himself. An extension of this doctrine might be
fashioned to include the case of the malformed infant. The infant,
through the substituted judgment by a guardian or parents would
have the right to decide whether the use of life sustaining apparatus
should be discontinued. This extension of the doctrine of substituted
judgment would, in part, be based on the constitutional "right of
seriously defective infants, see Brown and Truitt, Euthanasia and the The Right to Die,
3 OHI-o NORTh L. REV. 615, 632 (1976).
"See text accompanying note 33 supra.
"See, e.g., State v. Mally, 139 Mont. 599, 604, 366 P.2d 868, 873 (1961).
"See W. PROSSie, HANDBOOK OF TIE LAW OF TORTS, § 24 (4th ed. 197 1).
"170 N.J. at 35, 355 A.2d at 671.
"410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
1980]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
privacy" reserving certain decisions concerning personal integrity to
the individual."
Difficulties Inherent in Common Law Theories
The weaknesses in the above theories of nonliability become ap-
parent with little analysis. For example, the typical factual setting for
invoking the doctrine of necessity in defense to a criminal charge is
too far removed from the question of whether a concerned parent
should be permitted to decide whether life support should be
withdrawn from a severely deformed infant. The doctrine of
substituted judgment may be useful, for example, when managing the
financial matters of a normal minor; but it is the purest fiction when a
court, as in Saikewicz or Quinlan, attempts to anticipate what the
malformed premature infant would decide if he were capable of such
decision. Similarly, it would be difficult to make any sense out of an
argument that it might be an invasion of the privacy of an infant to
terminate the infant's life support.
A workable theory of nonliability might be developed on a case-by-
case basis, but this approach would prolong the agony and risk of
those involved in making these difficult decisions. Society is simply
faced with a new problem brought about by new technology and
what is needed is a deliberate and well-considered legislative ap-
proach.
It has been said, the law always lags behind the most advanced
thinking in every area. It must wait until theologians and the moral
leaders and events have created some common ground, some consen-
sus. " Whether this is true in the case of nontreatment of infants re-
mains to be seen. It is interesting to compare the factors physicians
consider in making their decisions with the legal approach outlined
above. A 1975 survey of pediatricians by the American Academy of
Pediatrics revealed that more than 80% did not believe that extraor-
dinary means should be used to save the life of each and every
newborn infant. When asked to list the factors to be considered when
deciding whether to withhold surgery in such cases, the pediatricians
listed potential quality of life as the strongest criterion. The next most
important criteria were possible adverse effects on the family, infant's
possible IQ, the parents' willingness to raise the child, and the cost to
society. 2
The gap between what the medical profession is utilizing in prac-
"Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969).
"Burger, The Law and Medical Advances, 67 ANN. INT'L MED. 17 (Supp. 1967)
quoted in Elkinton, The Dying Patient, the Doctor and the law, 13 VILL. L. REv. 740
(1968).
2L.A. Times, Apr. 22, 1979, pt. ii., at 4, col. 1.
[Vol. 2:35
ARTIFICIAL PROLONGATION OF LIFE
tice and the thinking of the courts is illustrated by the tendency of the
courts to reject "potential quality of life" as a relevant factor in the
decision for nontreatment. The court in Saikewicz stated that if quali-
ty of life is to be equated with value of life, they were rejecting quality
of life as a criterion."3
CONCLUSION: LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS
The lack of standards for nonliability for nontreatment and the
growing confusion and risks call for a legislative response. The com-
mon law evolution of the law has merits, inasmuch as the law can
develop based upon concrete factual cases. However, this process is
time consuming and grossly unfair in that it unnessarily subjects well
meaning and innocent parties to the risk of criminal and civil liabili-
ty.
The two questions to be resolved by legislatures are: What is the
proper decision-making process by which a decision of nontreatment
can be made; and what are the relevant factors to be utilized by the
decision-makers? The possibilities for the decision-making process
range from letting the parents alone decide the fate of their child to a
system whereby such a decision is made jointly by parents, the attend-
ing physicians and some sort of detached body or "Ethics
Committee." Removing the decision to the court§ or to some indepen-
dent body is also a possibility. The numerous factors which might be
considered relevant to the decision-makers include the quality of life
the infant would enjoy if treated, as well as the economic cost and
emotional suffering which have to be endured by both the parents and
the child.
Such questions are difficult. The law as it exists today and the pro-
cess by which it is being changed are both inadequate to meet the
task. Only through sound and comprehensive analysis of this problem
will answers be developed to meet the needs of premature, malformed
infants, their parents, and the physicians who treat them.
01370 N.E.2d at 432.
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